Book Reviews

Phaedo by Plato: An Honest Review

Last Updated: November 2026. Expanded the treatment of the four arguments and the death scene.

Quick Answer

The dialogue in which philosophy first said that the soul does not die, and then showed a man dying as if it were true. Socrates, on his last day, argues four times that the soul is immortal, introduces the Forms to do it, answers two friends who are not convinced, tells a myth of where souls go, and drinks the poison with a steadiness that has been the West's model of a good death for twenty-four centuries. The arguments do not prove what they claim, and the dialogue knows it. What it offers instead is the sight of someone who lived by them, and the claim that philosophy is the practice of dying is the one thing in the book that no objection has touched.

Key Takeaways

  • Philosophy as the practice of dying: separate the soul from the body before death does it for you.
  • Four arguments: cycles, recollection, affinity, and the soul as life itself.
  • The Forms, stated fully for the first time.
  • Two honest objections: the lyre and the weaver.
  • The death: a bath, a cup, a walk, a debt to Asclepius.

17 min read

What This Dialogue Is

The Phaedo is a dialogue of Plato's middle period, written probably in the 380s BCE, some fifteen years after the event it describes. It is around a hundred pages in translation. It completes the sequence of dialogues on Socrates's trial and death, the Euthyphro, Apology and Crito, and it is the longest and the most philosophical of them: the others show Socrates as he was, and the Phaedo shows him saying things, about Forms and recollection and the soul's affinity with the unchanging, that most scholars think are Plato's rather than his.

The dialogue is reported. Phaedo of Elis, a young follower who was in the cell, tells the story some time later to Echecrates, a Pythagorean in Phlius, who had heard that Socrates was dead and wanted to know how. So the conversation reaches us at two removes, through a witness and a listener, and the frame is part of the design: the argument for immortality is being carried, by memory, to people who did not hear it.

Plato's absence. Phaedo lists who was there and then says: Plato, I think, was ill. It is the only time Plato names himself in the dialogues, and it is to say he was not present. Readers have taken it as modesty, as a signal that the dialogue is composed rather than transcribed, and as grief. It is probably all three.

The Setting

Athens, 399 BCE. Socrates has been condemned for impiety and corrupting the young, and his execution was delayed a month because the sacred ship to Delos was at sea and no executions could take place until it returned. It has returned. His friends come to the prison at dawn, find him released from his chains and his wife Xanthippe with him, and she is sent home weeping. He rubs his leg where the chain was and remarks on how pleasure follows pain. The conversation begins.

The setting is not decoration. Everything said is said by a man who will drink poison at sunset, to people who will watch him do it, and the dialogue's power is that the argument and the death are the same event.

The Pythagorean Frame

Worth noticing before the argument begins.

Echecrates, who hears the story, is a Pythagorean. Simmias and Cebes, who carry the argument against Socrates, are Thebans who had studied with the Pythagorean Philolaus. The doctrine of the soul's transmigration, the prohibition on suicide, the analogy of the lyre, the mathematics of the true earth, all have Pythagorean sources, and the dialogue is in part Plato's conversation with a tradition that had already claimed the soul was immortal and had a way of life to match. The Orphic and Pythagorean background gives the dialogue its religious depth, and Socrates several times says that he is repeating what the mysteries have long taught.

Why Not Suicide

The first question, raised by Cebes.

If the philosopher welcomes death, why not hasten it? Socrates answers with a doctrine from the mysteries: we are in a kind of prison, or a guard-post, and must not release ourselves; we belong to the gods, as cattle belong to their owner, and an owner would be angry if the cattle killed themselves. One must wait until the god sends a necessity, as has now been sent to him. The argument is short and Socrates does not press it, but it establishes the frame: death is to be welcomed but not seized, and the philosopher's readiness is not the same as a wish to die.

Philosophy as the Practice of Dying

The dialogue's thesis, stated before any argument for immortality.

Socrates says that those who practise philosophy rightly are practising nothing other than dying and being dead. Death is the separation of soul from body. The philosopher, in his life, seeks to separate them as far as he can: he does not care for the body's pleasures, food, drink, sex, fine clothes; he distrusts the senses, which deceive; he pursues truth by pure thought, which the body hinders with its needs and its noise; and he wants above all the knowledge of what things really are, the just itself, the beautiful itself, which the soul can reach only when it is alone. The philosopher, then, spends his life preparing for what death will complete, and it would be absurd for him to fear at the end what he has been practising all along.

The passage has been the charter of philosophical asceticism in the West, from the Neoplatonists to the monks to Montaigne's essay that borrows its title. It is also the clearest statement in Plato of why the body is a problem, and readers who find it too hostile to the flesh should know that the Symposium and the Phaedrus take a warmer view.

The Cyclical Argument

The first argument for immortality, and the weakest.

Everything that has an opposite comes to be from its opposite: the larger from the smaller, the weaker from the stronger, sleeping from waking and waking from sleeping. Living and dead are opposites. So the dead come from the living, which we see, and the living must come from the dead, which we do not see but must infer; otherwise everything would end up dead and nothing would come back. The souls of the dead, then, exist somewhere, and return.

The argument depends on treating being dead as a state a soul is in, rather than as the absence of a soul, and Socrates's listeners accept it too easily. It is best read as an ancient doctrine, the cycle of rebirth, given a logical dress, and the dialogue moves on quickly.

The Argument From Recollection

The second argument, and the one that introduces the Forms.

Cebes reminds Socrates of a doctrine he has taught before, in the Meno: that learning is recollection. Socrates develops it. We see two sticks that are equal, and we judge them equal, but we also see that they fall short of being perfectly equal, that they are equal in one respect and not another. To judge that they fall short, we must already know what perfect equality is, the Equal itself. We did not get this knowledge from the sticks, since the sticks fall short of it, and we did not get it from any sense experience, since all sensible things fall short. We must have had it before we began to use our senses, which is to say before birth. So the soul existed before the body, and knew the Forms, and what we call learning is remembering.

The argument establishes pre-existence, not survival, as Simmias and Cebes point out, and it needs the cyclical argument to complete it. But it is the dialogue's most fertile idea, and it is the source of every later doctrine that the soul brings knowledge with it into the world.

The Forms

Introduced in the recollection argument and now stated as a doctrine.

There is the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, the Good itself, the Just itself: each a single, unchanging, invisible reality, grasped by reason alone, in which the many changing sensible things share, imperfectly, and by which they are what they are. Beautiful things are beautiful because they participate in the Beautiful. The Forms do not come to be or pass away; they are always the same; they are what the philosopher seeks to know; and they are what the soul knew before birth and recollects.

This is the theory in its first full statement, and the Phaedo is where a reader should meet it. Later dialogues, the Republic, the Timaeus, the Parmenides, develop and complicate it, and the last criticises it; here it is fresh and it is doing work, holding up the argument for the soul.

The Affinity Argument

The third argument, from the soul's resemblance to the Forms.

There are two kinds of thing: the visible, composite, changing, which is dissolved; and the invisible, simple, unchanging, which is not. The body is of the first kind. The soul, which knows the Forms and is most itself when it thinks without the body, is akin to the second. What is akin to the indissoluble is likely to be indissoluble, or nearly so. And the soul that has lived a philosophical life, keeping itself pure of the body, goes at death to the invisible and divine, while the soul that has loved the body is dragged back, weighed down, and haunts tombs until it is reborn in an animal suited to its habits: the glutton as an ass, the tyrant as a wolf, the decent citizen as a bee.

The argument is one of likelihood and Socrates presents it as such. Its picture of the philosopher's soul rising and the body-lover's sinking is the dialogue's moral core and the source of the Neoplatonic and Christian doctrine of the soul's purification.

The Warning Against Misology

An interlude that many readers find the dialogue's wisest page.

After Simmias and Cebes object and the company is discouraged, Socrates warns against misology, the hatred of argument. People who trust an argument and are let down, and then another, come to distrust all reasoning, as people betrayed by friends come to distrust everyone; but the fault is in their lack of skill, not in argument. One should blame oneself, not the logos, and keep trying. And he adds, with the hemlock hours away, that he is in danger of arguing for immortality not as a philosopher but as a partisan, wanting it to be true, and asks them to watch him for it and to care more for the truth than for Socrates.

The passage is the dialogue admitting what it is: a man arguing for his own survival on the day of his death, and asking to be held to a higher standard than his situation would excuse.

Simmias and the Lyre

The first objection.

Simmias proposes that the soul may be like the attunement of a lyre: invisible, incorporeal, beautiful, divine, and yet entirely dependent on the strings and wood, and destroyed when they are. The soul may be a harmony of the body's elements, and end when the body does. It is a materialist theory, drawn from Pythagorean and medical thought, and it is stated so well that Socrates praises it.

His answer: the recollection argument showed that the soul exists before the body, and no attunement exists before its instrument; a soul can be more or less virtuous, but an attunement cannot be more or less an attunement; and the soul rules the body, resisting its desires, while an attunement cannot oppose its strings. Simmias concedes.

Cebes and the Weaver

The second objection, and the harder one.

Cebes grants that the soul is stronger and longer-lasting than the body and existed before it. But a weaver outlives many cloaks and is finally outlived by the last; the soul may outlast many bodies, through many rebirths, and still be worn out and perish at last. Nothing so far shows that it is imperishable, and a man facing death has reason to fear that this is his soul's last body.

Socrates says the question requires a full inquiry into the cause of coming to be and passing away, and he tells the story of his own search for it.

Socrates's Intellectual Autobiography

A digression that is one of the most important passages in Greek philosophy.

As a young man, Socrates says, he was eager for natural science and asked what causes things: whether we think with blood or air or fire, how things grow. He became confused, unable even to say why two is more than one. Then he heard that Anaxagoras taught that Mind ordered all things, and hoped to learn that everything was arranged for the best; but Anaxagoras used Mind only as a starting point and explained everything by air and water. Socrates gave up on physical causes, which explain how but not why, and took refuge in the logos: he would posit the Forms, the Beautiful itself and so on, and explain that things are beautiful by participating in the Beautiful, and would test each hypothesis by its consequences and, if challenged, go back to a higher one.

The passage is Plato's account of the turn from natural philosophy to the method of hypothesis, and it is where Western philosophy's distinction between explanation by matter and explanation by reason was first drawn.

The Final Argument

The answer to Cebes, and the dialogue's culmination.

Some things are so characterised by a Form that they cannot admit its opposite: snow is cold and cannot become hot while remaining snow, but retreats or perishes; fire is hot and cannot admit cold; three is odd and cannot admit the even. The soul is what brings life to a body; whatever the soul occupies, it makes alive. So the soul is characterised by life as fire is by heat, and it cannot admit the opposite of life, which is death. It is deathless. And what is deathless is also indestructible, since if the deathless could be destroyed nothing could be. So at the approach of death the soul does not perish but withdraws, intact, elsewhere.

Cebes is convinced. Simmias is not quite: he says he still has doubts, given the greatness of the subject and human weakness. Socrates does not rebuke him. He says the first hypotheses need further examination, and that if they are examined sufficiently, the argument will be followed as far as a human being can follow it.

The final argument's weakness is well known: it shows that the soul, while it exists, cannot be dead, which is true but trivial, and does not show that the soul must continue to exist. What is remarkable is that the dialogue seems to know this. Simmias keeps his doubt, Socrates accepts it, and the conversation moves from proof to myth and then to the cup. Plato is not claiming to have demonstrated immortality. He is showing a man who has argued for it as well as he can, who admits the arguments are not final, and who then dies as though they were. The demonstration, if there is one, is in the death, and the arguments are what a philosopher does on the morning of it.

The Myth of the True Earth

The story Socrates tells when the argument is done.

The earth we live on, he says, is not the true earth. We live in one of many hollows in a vast sphere, as fish live at the bottom of the sea and think its surface is the sky, and the air we breathe is the sediment of the true air above. The true earth's surface, which we would see if we could rise through the air as fish rise through water, is of colours purer than ours, with trees and stones and animals of a beauty we cannot imagine, and its inhabitants see the sun and moon and stars as they are and dwell with the gods. Below, the earth is pierced by channels through which the great rivers flow, Oceanus, Acheron, Pyriphlegethon of fire, Cocytus of lamentation, and Tartarus, the chasm into which they all pour. Souls after death are judged and sent: the ordinary to Acheron and purification, the curable wicked to Tartarus for a year and then to beg forgiveness from their victims at the shore, the incurable to Tartarus forever, and those who have purified themselves by philosophy to live without bodies in places more beautiful still, which he says he cannot describe.

Socrates does not claim the myth is true. He says that something like it is true, and that a man may risk the belief, for the risk is a fine one. The geography of the afterlife in the myth has fed every later Western vision, Virgil's and Dante's among them.

The Death of Socrates

The last pages, told by Phaedo.

Socrates goes to bathe, so that the women will not have to wash his body. His three sons and the women of his household are brought, he speaks with them, and they are sent away. The servant of the Eleven comes to say that the time has come, weeps, calls Socrates the noblest and gentlest and best man who ever came to the prison, and leaves. Crito begs him to wait, since the sun is still on the hills; Socrates says he would be ridiculous to himself if he clung to life when there was none left. The man with the cup comes. Socrates asks whether he may pour a libation; there is only enough for the dose. He prays that his passage to the other world may be fortunate, and drinks it without a tremor or a change of colour. His friends break down; he rebukes them: he had sent the women away so as not to have this, and one should die in silence. They are ashamed and stop.

He walks about until his legs are heavy, then lies on his back. The man presses his feet and asks if he feels it; he does not. The cold rises. When it reaches his waist, he uncovers his face and speaks.

The Cock for Asclepius

Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius; pay it and do not neglect it. Crito says it will be done and asks if there is anything else. There is no answer. After a little, a movement; the man draws the cloth back; his eyes are fixed. Crito closes his mouth and eyes.

Asclepius was the god of healing, and a cock was the customary thank-offering for a cure. The reading most readers reach is that Socrates is calling death the cure for the disease of life in the body, in keeping with the whole dialogue. Nietzsche read it as Socrates's confession that life had been an illness and hated him for it. Others have argued that the offering was for someone else's recovery, perhaps Plato's from the illness that kept him away, or that it is simply a pious man's last unfinished business. Plato gives no gloss. The last words of the wisest of the Greeks are a small debt to a god of medicine, and their reticence is their force.

Phaedo ends: such was the end of our friend, a man who, we may say, was of all those we knew in our time the best, and the wisest and the most just.

Do the Arguments Work?

A fair verdict.

No, not as proofs. The cyclical argument confuses states with absences. The recollection argument shows pre-existence at most and assumes the Forms. The affinity argument is explicitly a likelihood. The final argument shows only that the soul is alive while it exists. Each has been faulted since Aristotle, and modern commentators have found no reconstruction that rescues them as demonstrations. Simmias's doubt at the end is the reader's, and Plato put it there.

What the dialogue does establish is something else: that the question is serious, that the arguments can be made, that the alternative theories have their own problems, and that a life can be lived and a death died on the strength of a reasoned hope. Socrates calls it a fine risk. The dialogue is the West's first and still its fullest statement of what such a risk looks like, and readers who want the argument settled are asking for something Plato did not offer and may have thought impossible.

The Afterlife of the Dialogue

The Phaedo was the text through which the Greek doctrine of the immortal soul passed into the West. The Neoplatonists commented on it and made its purification their ascent. Cicero translated it and had it read to him; Cato read it the night before his suicide. The Church Fathers used its arguments and its ascetic frame. Boethius's Consolation is written in its shadow. The Renaissance Platonists revived it, Montaigne borrowed its thesis, and David's painting of the death scene fixed the image. In the modern period it became the target: Hume's essay on immortality, Nietzsche's contempt, and the whole materialist tradition are answers to it. It is still the dialogue by which a reader learns what the question of the soul was before it became a question of neurons.

The Translations

David Gallop's Oxford translation, with commentary, is the standard scholarly text and the edition reviewed here. G. M. A. Grube's, revised by John Cooper in the Hackett Complete Works, is clear and the most used in teaching. Hugh Tredennick's Penguin, revised by Harold Tarrant in The Last Days of Socrates, is readable and pairs the dialogue with the trial. Christopher Rowe's Cambridge edition has the Greek and the fullest commentary. Any of them will do; Gallop or Rowe for the argument, Tredennick for the story.

Who Should Read It

Read it if you want the origin of the Western doctrine of the soul, in the text that made it.

Read it if you are facing death, your own or another's, and want a companion that argues, admits doubt, and then shows how it is done.

Read it for the Forms if you are beginning Plato, since this is where they are introduced and where they earn their keep.

Read the last ten pages if you read nothing else, and then go back and read the argument they were the answer to.

The dialogue's teaching is not that the soul is immortal. It is that a life can be arranged so that the question does not terrify. Socrates spent his years separating what in him could think from what in him could only want, until the part that could think was what he mostly was, and when the body was taken the loss was, by his own account, of something he had already set aside. Whether anything survived is what the arguments try to settle and cannot. What the death settles is that the practice works: a man who has lived as though the soul mattered more than the body can drink the cup without a tremor, and his friends, who have not, weep. The book is an argument about immortality wrapped around an instruction about how to live, and the instruction is the part that is proven.

Socrates's last day: four arguments for the soul, the Forms in their first statement, the myth of the true earth, and the death that has been the West's model since.

Phaedo on Amazon

Affiliate disclosure: Thalira earns a small commission on purchases made through the link above, at no additional cost to you. Our verdict that the dialogue's arguments do not succeed as proofs is given above and was not softened for the link.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Phaedo about?

Socrates's last day in the Athenian prison in 399 BCE, spent in conversation with his friends about whether the soul survives death. He offers four arguments that it does, answers objections, tells a myth of the soul's destinations, bathes, says goodbye to his family, drinks the hemlock and dies. The dialogue is narrated by Phaedo, who was present, to a Pythagorean in Phlius.

When was it written?

Probably in the 380s BCE, in Plato's middle period, after the Meno and around the time of the Symposium and before the Republic. It is the first dialogue to state the theory of Forms fully and the first to build an argument on it.

What are the four arguments?

The cyclical argument, that opposites come from opposites, so the living come from the dead as the dead from the living; the recollection argument, that learning is remembering knowledge the soul had before birth; the affinity argument, that the soul resembles the invisible, unchanging Forms and so shares their permanence; and the final argument, that the soul is what brings life and cannot admit its opposite, death.

What are the Forms?

The unchanging, intelligible realities, the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, the Good itself, which sensible things imperfectly share in and which the soul knows by reason rather than sense. The Phaedo introduces them as the objects of the philosopher's knowledge and as the guarantee that the soul, which knows them, is of their kind.

What is the argument from recollection?

That we recognise sensible things as falling short of perfect equality or beauty, which we could not do unless we already knew the perfect standard, and that since we did not learn it in this life, the soul must have known it before birth. Learning is recollection, and the soul existed before the body.

Who objects, and how?

Simmias argues that the soul may be like the attunement of a lyre, which does not survive the instrument; Cebes argues that the soul may outlast many bodies, as a weaver outlasts many cloaks, and still wear out. Socrates answers both, and the answer to Cebes is the final argument.

What is the myth at the end?

That the earth we live on is a hollow in a much larger true earth, whose upper surface is the real world of colour and light, and that below are rivers of water and fire and mud through which souls are sorted after death: the wicked to Tartarus, the ordinary to purification, and the purified philosophers to dwell without bodies above.

What does Socrates say about philosophy?

That philosophy is the practice of dying: the philosopher spends his life separating soul from body, refusing the body's pleasures and errors, and pursuing the truth that only the soul can grasp, so that death, which completes the separation, is what he has been preparing for. This is why he does not fear it.

How does Socrates die?

Calmly. He bathes so the women will not have to wash his corpse, sees his sons, rebukes his friends for weeping, drinks the cup without hesitation, walks until his legs are heavy, lies down, and as the cold rises says his last words: Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius. His face is covered, and Phaedo calls him the best and wisest and most just man he knew.

What do the last words mean?

Asclepius was the god of healing, and a cock was offered on recovery from illness. The usual reading is that Socrates treats death as the cure for the illness of life in the body. Other readings take it as a debt for someone else's recovery, or as irony. Plato does not explain it.

Do the arguments work?

Not as proofs. Each has been faulted since antiquity, and Simmias says at the end that he still has doubts, which Socrates does not rebuke. The dialogue seems to know its arguments are not conclusive and to offer, alongside them, the example of how a man who believed them died.

Who should read it?

Anyone who wants the West's founding statement on the soul and its survival, anyone approaching death or grief who wants a companion that does not flinch, students of Plato who need the Forms in their first full form, and anyone who wants to see what philosophy looked like when it was a way of dying well.

Practise the separation once

Socrates's definition of philosophy is a practice, and it can be tried in an afternoon. Sit still, and for a while attend to what in you is body: hunger, restlessness, the itch, the wish to check something. Then attend to what in you is watching those things, and ask whether it is any of them. The dialogue's claim is that the watcher is not the body, that it can be strengthened by being used, and that a person who has spent years on the watcher's side has less to lose when the body goes. You do not have to believe in the true earth to notice that there is a watcher. Noticing it is the first step of the practice of dying, and Socrates thought it was also the first step of living well.

Sources & References

  • Plato. Phaedo, trans. David Gallop, Oxford World's Classics, 1993, with his Clarendon commentary, 1975.
  • Plato. Phaedo, ed. and trans. C. J. Rowe, Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics, 1993.
  • Plato. The Last Days of Socrates, trans. Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant, Penguin, 2003.
  • Bostock, David. Plato's Phaedo, Oxford, 1986, for the arguments.
  • Burnet, John. Plato's Phaedo, Oxford, 1911, for the Pythagorean background.
  • Montaigne, Michel de. "That to Philosophise Is to Learn to Die," Essays I.20.
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