The Presence of the Past by Rupert Sheldrake: An Honest Review

Last Updated: October 2026. Expanded the assessment of the experimental record and the section on memory.

Quick Answer

Sheldrake's claim is that nature has habits rather than laws, and that a pattern gets easier to repeat each time it happens anywhere. This is the full version of the argument, not the short 1981 statement that got him denounced in Nature. He identifies a real gap in developmental biology, proposes a mechanism nobody can locate, and designs tests that have come back ambiguous for forty years. Read it for the question, and hold the answer loosely.

Key Takeaways

  • Habits, not laws. Regularity built by repetition rather than fixed at the start.
  • The developmental gap is real. Genes make proteins, and form is a further question.
  • The mechanism is unspecified, which is the objection that has never been answered.
  • Testable in principle, and the tests have not come back clean.
  • Read this rather than the 1981 book. It is the argument at full strength.

🕑 17 min read

What This Book Is

The Presence of the Past: Morphic Resonance and the Habits of Nature was published in 1988. It runs a little under four hundred pages and has been reissued with new material several times since.

It is the full development of a hypothesis Sheldrake had proposed seven years earlier in a shorter book. That first statement caused a considerable row, and this one is written with the row in view: the objections are stated and answered, the evidence is set out, and the scope is widened enormously.

The subject is how anything comes to have the form it has, and how that form is repeated. Sheldrake's answer runs from crystals through embryos to instincts, habits, memory and social behaviour, all handled by one proposed mechanism.

It is written for a general reader, argued carefully, and considerably more disciplined than its reputation suggests.

Which book to read. The 1981 A New Science of Life is the famous one and the shorter one. This is the better one: fuller, more careful, and written by someone who has spent seven years being attacked and has thought about why.

Who Rupert Sheldrake Is

Sheldrake was born in Nottinghamshire in 1942 and had a conventionally distinguished scientific start.

He read natural sciences at Cambridge, took a fellowship at Harvard studying philosophy and history of science, returned to Cambridge for a doctorate in biochemistry, and became a research fellow at Clare College.

His scientific work was on plant development, specifically on the hormone auxin and how it governs the differentiation of plant tissue. This is directly relevant: the question of how a plant cell knows what to become was his professional subject before it became his heresy.

He then spent several years in India as principal plant physiologist at an international crops research institute, working on legumes, and lived for a period in an ashram in Tamil Nadu.

The Indian years matter for reading him. The hypothesis was written there, and the framework of a memory inherent in nature has obvious affinities with what he was living alongside, which he does not particularly conceal.

The Book for Burning

The episode that defined his public reception, and it is worth stating accurately because it is usually exaggerated in both directions.

When A New Science of Life appeared in 1981, John Maddox, then editor of Nature, wrote an editorial describing it as the best candidate for burning there had been in many years.

Maddox later clarified that he meant it as a judgement about pseudoscience rather than a literal recommendation, and he returned to the subject on television years afterward, saying Sheldrake was putting forward magic instead of science and that this was a heresy.

The effect was the opposite of what was intended. The editorial made the book famous, sold a great many copies, and gave Sheldrake a durable position as the scientist establishment science had tried to suppress.

It also made assessment harder. The dispute became about whether he should be allowed to speak rather than about whether he was right, and forty years later a great deal of the discussion is still stuck there.

The Problem of Form

The question the whole book proceeds from, and it is a real one.

An oak seedling becomes an oak. A fertilised egg becomes a particular animal with a particular shape. A broken crystal of a given compound regrows in the same lattice. In each case a specific form appears reliably, and the question is what determines it.

The standard answer is genetic. The DNA carries the instructions, the instructions are executed, the form results.

Sheldrake's objection is that this describes the process at the wrong level. Genes code for proteins. A protein is a molecule, and a great many molecules assembled in a container do not spontaneously arrange themselves into a hand.

His claim is that between the chemistry and the shape there is a step nobody has specified, and that the confidence of the standard account rests on the step being assumed rather than shown.

What Genes Do Not Explain

The argument developed, since this is the part critics say he misrepresents.

His examples are chosen carefully. Your arms and legs contain the same genes and take different shapes. Every cell in an organism carries the same genome and they differentiate into hundreds of types. Species with nearly identical genetic sequences have visibly different bodies.

In each case the genetic information is constant while the outcome varies, so something besides the sequence is determining which outcome occurs.

The mainstream response, and it is a substantial one, is that this is exactly what developmental biology studies. Gene regulation, positional signalling, chemical gradients, mechanical forces between cells, and the timing of expression together account for differentiation, and the field has advanced enormously since 1988.

Sheldrake's reply is that these describe how the process unfolds without explaining what it is unfolding toward, and that a gradient telling a cell where it is does not tell it what the finished organism should look like.

Whether that is a genuine remaining gap or a demand for a kind of explanation biology does not owe is the crux, and reasonable people land differently.

It is worth separating two claims that get run together. The first is that there is an unexplained step between molecular chemistry and three-dimensional form. That is defensible, and many developmental biologists would agree the problem is unsolved even while expecting a conventional solution. The second is that the missing factor is a field carrying influence from past organisms across time. Accepting the first does not commit you to the second, and most of the argument about Sheldrake proceeds as though it does.

Morphic Fields

The first half of his proposal.

Sheldrake posits organising fields associated with systems at every level: molecules, crystals, cells, tissues, organisms, and social groups.

A morphic field guides the development of the system it belongs to toward a characteristic form. It is not made of matter or energy in the ordinary sense, and it acts by shaping probabilities rather than by pushing anything.

The idea of a formative field was not his invention. Developmental biologists in the early twentieth century had proposed morphogenetic fields precisely because the chemistry seemed insufficient, and the concept remained in use as a descriptive term.

What Sheldrake adds is the claim that these fields are real entities with a history rather than convenient descriptions.

Morphic Resonance

The second half, and the part that generates the controversy.

The fields, he proposes, are shaped by what has happened before. Similar systems influence each other across time and space by similarity alone, without any energetic connection, and the influence accumulates.

The consequences are specific and strange. The more often a form has occurred, the more probable it becomes. A new compound is difficult to crystallise the first time and easier afterwards, everywhere. An animal learning a new task makes it slightly easier for unrelated animals of the same species to learn it later.

There is no signal, no carrier, and no attenuation with distance. Resonance operates on similarity, so a system is influenced most by its own past states and then by systems most like it.

Laws as Habits

The extension to physics, and the most philosophically ambitious part of the book.

If regularities are built by repetition, then the laws of nature are not eternal constraints. They are habits the universe has developed, and they were less settled early on than they are now.

Sheldrake points out that the assumption of fixed eternal laws is itself a historical inheritance, arriving from a theology in which an unchanging God legislates for creation, and that it was retained after the theology was dropped.

He notes that this sits oddly with an evolutionary universe. Everything else has a history, and physics alone is treated as exempt.

The testable version is that fundamental constants might drift over time. He points to variation in the published values of the gravitational constant across decades as suggestive, and this is the weakest evidence in the book, since measurement disagreements have obvious mundane explanations.

The Crystal Evidence

The case he leans on most, because it is the one with a real phenomenon behind it.

Chemists have long reported that a newly synthesised compound can be difficult to crystallise at first, and that it becomes easier over the following years, including in laboratories with no contact with the original.

The conventional explanation is seeding. Microscopic crystal fragments travel on clothing, in air, and on visiting scientists, and a trace of seed material initiates crystallisation in a supersaturated solution.

Sheldrake accepts that seeding is real and argues it does not cover every case, since the effect is reported in labs with no personnel contact and across long distances.

The honest position is that the phenomenon is anecdotal and has not been studied systematically enough to distinguish the explanations, which is a fair description of a great deal of the evidence in this book.

Memory Without Storage

The application that interests most readers, and the most radical.

Sheldrake proposes that memories are not stored in the brain. What the brain does is tune into your own past states by resonance, so that remembering is more like receiving than like retrieving a file.

His evidence is the difficulty of locating a memory trace. Karl Lashley's experiments removing portions of trained rats' cortex found that performance degraded with the amount removed rather than with the location, and no specific site for a given memory was found.

The mainstream reading is that memory is distributed across networks rather than localised, which is now well supported by work on synaptic change and on engram cells.

Sheldrake's reading is that distribution is what you would expect if the brain is a receiver rather than a store, and that damaging a television does not prove the programme was inside it.

The analogy is memorable and it does not discriminate between the hypotheses, since a distributed store predicts the same observations.

The Experiments

Sheldrake deserves credit for proposing tests, and the results deserve a straight account.

The rat maze evidence comes from a long series of experiments begun by William McDougall at Harvard in the 1920s, intended to test the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Later generations of rats learned the task faster. Follow-up work in Scotland and Australia found that control rats, never bred from trained ancestors, also improved.

Sheldrake reads that as supporting resonance, since improvement without genetic descent is exactly what he predicts. Critics read it as showing the original result was an artefact of changing experimental technique across decades.

The human tests are more direct. Subjects are shown hidden-figure images or newly composed material, and the question is whether recognition improves in a population after many people have seen the solution.

Results have been mixed. Some trials report small effects, others none, and the largest and best-controlled attempts have not produced a clean positive.

After four decades this is the fair summary: the hypothesis has not been refuted and it has not been established, and the evidential situation has not improved much.

The Objections

Four, in descending order of force.

No mechanism. Resonance acts without a carrier, without energy transfer, and without attenuation. Nothing in physics permits this, and Sheldrake does not propose a modification of physics that would.

Underdetermined predictions. Because the strength of resonance depends on similarity, and similarity is not quantified, a failed experiment can be explained by the systems having been insufficiently similar. That flexibility is a serious problem for testing.

The gap may be closing. Developmental biology has advanced considerably since 1988, and a good deal that looked mysterious then now has conventional accounts.

Selective evidence. The supporting cases are anecdotal or contested, and the pattern of citing suggestive results while discounting negative ones is visible.

The Missing Mechanism

The objection that matters most, developed properly.

A scientific hypothesis is usually expected to say how a proposed effect occurs, and morphic resonance says only that similar things influence similar things.

Sheldrake's defence is historical and not unreasonable. Newton proposed gravity without a mechanism and was criticised for exactly this, having introduced action at a distance with no account of how. Darwin proposed natural selection without knowing how inheritance worked. Continental drift was rejected for decades because no mechanism could move continents.

The reply is that in each of those cases the phenomenon was independently well established before the mechanism arrived. Falling bodies and the shapes of coastlines were not in dispute.

Morphic resonance is in the opposite position. Both the mechanism and the phenomenon are in question, and a hypothesis with neither a demonstrated effect nor a proposed cause is asking a great deal.

How He Has Been Treated

Worth addressing, since the treatment has become part of the story and both sides overstate it.

Sheldrake has not been silenced. He has published widely, sold a great many books, held research funding, and spoken at length in public for four decades.

He has been treated with hostility disproportionate to the claim. The burning editorial, the withdrawal of a recorded talk from a conference platform, and the general tone of the response go beyond ordinary scientific disagreement.

What that hostility has cost is clarity. A hypothesis treated as heresy attracts defenders who are not evaluating it, and generates a constituency invested in the establishment being wrong, and the actual question of whether the effect exists gets less attention than the politics.

The same dynamic appears wherever a discipline polices its boundaries, and Kripal's account of how subjects become unstudiable describes the mechanism well.

The Later Work and What It Costs Him

Worth knowing, because it affects how this book gets received now.

After The Presence of the Past, Sheldrake turned to a series of investigations that were easier to test and considerably easier to mock: whether dogs know when their owners are coming home, whether people can tell they are being stared at, whether someone can sense who is calling before answering the phone.

He treats these as applications of the same idea. If fields extend beyond bodies and connect systems that have been linked, then a bond between an animal and a person is a field phenomenon and should produce measurable anticipation.

The work is methodologically more careful than its reputation. The dog studies used continuously timed video and randomised return times, and the reported effect was that the animal went to the window at the point the owner set off rather than at a habitual hour.

Critics reanalysed the same footage and argued the effect disappeared under different criteria for what counted as waiting, and the dispute over analytic choices was never resolved.

What this did to his standing is the relevant point for a reader of this book. Staring detection and telephone telepathy are far easier to dismiss than developmental biology, and the later subjects have coloured the reception of the earlier argument. A reader who comes to The Presence of the Past after hearing about the dog is likely to arrive with a verdict already formed, and the book deserves better than to be judged on what its author did next.

What Survives

Three things, whatever you conclude about resonance.

The question about form. How chemistry becomes shape is a genuine problem, and Sheldrake states it more clearly than most textbooks.

The point about laws. That we inherited the assumption of eternal fixed laws from theology, and retained it without argument in an otherwise evolutionary picture, is a fair historical observation.

The willingness to be tested. He proposes experiments, publishes protocols, and reports negative results, which is more than most people arguing at this boundary manage.

Who Should Read It

Read it if you have encountered morphic resonance secondhand and want the actual argument, which is more careful than either its supporters or its critics suggest.

Read it if you are interested in how scientific orthodoxy handles a challenge from inside its own credentialled ranks.

Read it alongside the parapsychology literature, which faces the same evidential difficulty and handles it differently.

Do not read it as established, and be careful of the popular versions, which drop the caution Sheldrake himself maintains.

The idea worth sitting with, independent of whether the biology holds, is that repetition might be constitutive rather than incidental. On Sheldrake's picture nothing that has happened is finished; every occurrence makes its own recurrence marginally more available, and what we call a law is just a groove worn deep. Whether or not that is true of crystals, it is observably true of a person. What you have done before is easier to do again. You did not decide that; the path simply exists, and by the time a habit looks like character it has simply been repeated past the point where choosing enters into it.

The full argument for morphic resonance, by the biologist who has spent forty years defending it.

The Presence of the Past on Amazon

Affiliate disclosure: Thalira earns a small commission on purchases made through the link above, at no additional cost to you. Our account of the missing mechanism and of the ambiguous experimental record is set out above and is independent of the link.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is The Presence of the Past about?

Rupert Sheldrake's full statement of morphic resonance, the hypothesis that patterns of form and behaviour are transmitted across time by similarity rather than being fixed by unchanging laws.

Who is Rupert Sheldrake?

A British biologist, born in 1942, trained at Cambridge and Harvard, who worked on plant development and did research in India before proposing morphic resonance in 1981.

What is morphic resonance?

The proposal that similar things influence similar things across space and time, so that once a pattern has occurred it becomes easier for that pattern to occur again elsewhere without any physical connection.

What is a morphic field?

His term for the organising field that shapes a system, carrying the accumulated influence of previous similar systems and guiding a developing organism toward the form its predecessors took.

What problem was he trying to solve?

How a developing organism knows what shape to become. Genes specify proteins, and Sheldrake argues the step from a set of proteins to a specific three-dimensional form is not accounted for.

Does he say the laws of nature are habits?

Yes, and it is his most far-reaching claim. On this view regularities are established by repetition rather than being fixed at the beginning, so the constants of physics could drift over time.

What experiments has it produced?

Tests of whether newly learned tasks become easier for later unconnected subjects, including rat maze learning and human recognition of new patterns. Results have been mixed and disputed.

Why is it so controversial?

Because it requires action across time without a known carrier, which conflicts with the physical picture, and because an editor of Nature suggested the first book was a candidate for burning.

Is it pseudoscience?

It is testable in principle and Sheldrake proposes tests, which distinguishes it from unfalsifiable claims. Critics argue the tests done have not supported it and that the mechanism is unspecified.

How does this book differ from A New Science of Life?

The 1981 book proposed the hypothesis. This one develops it fully, covering physics, chemistry, biology, memory and social behaviour, and engages the criticisms made in the intervening years.

What does it say about memory?

That memory may not be stored in the brain at all, but accessed by resonance with one's own past states, which would explain why searches for a physical memory trace have been inconclusive.

Who should read it?

Readers who want the actual argument rather than the caricature, and anyone interested in what a serious challenge to mainstream biology looks like when it is made carefully.

Separate the question from the answer

The most useful habit this book can teach has nothing to do with fields. Sheldrake asks a good question, proposes an answer that probably is not right, and the two are frequently treated as one thing, so that rejecting the answer is taken to dissolve the question. It does not. How chemistry becomes shape remains open whether or not morphic fields exist. Getting into the practice of holding a question after declining its answer is difficult, and it is where most of the interesting territory in any field turns out to be.

Sources & References

  • Sheldrake, Rupert (1988). The Presence of the Past: Morphic Resonance and the Habits of Nature.
  • Sheldrake, R. A New Science of Life, the original 1981 statement.
  • Maddox, John. Nature editorial, 1981, and subsequent commentary.
  • McDougall, W. and later replications of the rat maze experiments.
  • Lashley, K. S. Work on the search for the memory trace.
  • Published critiques of morphic resonance from developmental biology.
Back to blog

Leave a comment

Please note, comments need to be approved before they are published.