Quick Answer
A thousand scraps, some sorted into chapters and the rest in bundles, left by a mathematician who died at thirty-nine before he could write the book they were for. The book was to be a defence of Christianity, and its method was to describe the human condition so exactly, the two infinities, the thinking reed, the boredom that drives us to hunt and gamble rather than sit in a room, the self we cannot look at, that the reader would recognise the wound and want the cure. The wager is one scrap among many and the least of them. The diagnosis is the greatest account of what it is to be human that the seventeenth century produced, and atheists have read it as gladly as believers.
Key Takeaways
- Wretchedness and greatness: the human being as a deposed king who remembers.
- The two infinities: suspended between everything and nothing.
- Diversion: all unhappiness comes from not being able to stay in a room.
- The hidden God: enough light to seek, enough dark to refuse.
- The Memorial: two hours of fire, sewn into a coat.
17 min read
What This Book Is
The Pensées, Thoughts, are the papers Pascal left at his death in 1662: around a thousand fragments written on sheets that he cut into strips and threaded onto strings by subject, some of the bundles titled and ordered by him in 1658 when he presented the plan of his book to friends at Port-Royal, and the rest loose. The book they were for was an apology for the Christian religion, addressed to the sceptical worldly man of his century, and it was never written. His family and the Port-Royal community published a selection in 1670, and the fragments have been rearranged, expanded and reordered by editors since.
The Penguin edition reviewed here, translated by A. J. Krailsheimer, follows the Lafuma order, which respects Pascal's own bundles and puts the twenty-seven titled chapters first. In it the book runs to around three hundred and fifty pages, of which the first third is the sorted material and the rest the unsorted.
It is a book of fragments about the fragmentation of the human being, and its form, which was an accident of death, has come to seem its meaning.
A plan, not a book. Pascal told his friends the apology would take ten years of health, and he had four years of illness. The sorted chapters show the shape: first the misery of man without God, drawn from nature and the philosophers; then the happiness of man with God, drawn from Scripture, prophecy and the figure of Christ. The unsorted fragments include the most famous passages, the wager, the reed, the two infinities, and it is not always clear where they were to go. Readers should hold the plan in mind and let the fragments fall where they will.
Who Pascal Was
Blaise Pascal was born at Clermont in the Auvergne in 1623, the son of a tax official and mathematician who educated him at home after his mother's death. At sixteen he wrote an essay on conic sections that Descartes refused to believe was a boy's; at nineteen he designed and built a mechanical calculator for his father's tax work; in his twenties he repeated Torricelli's barometer experiment, had his brother-in-law carry a tube of mercury up the Puy de Dôme to show the air's weight, and established the vacuum against the Aristotelians; and in 1654, in correspondence with Fermat about a gambling problem, he laid the foundations of probability theory. He was, by thirty, one of the first mathematicians and physicists in Europe.
He was also ill for most of his life, with an unknown wasting illness and, at the end, agonising headaches. In 1646 the family encountered Jansenism, an austere Augustinian movement within French Catholicism, and were converted; Pascal fell away into a worldly period in the early 1650s, among the Paris salons and the gaming tables, and then, on a November night in 1654, had the experience he called fire. He gave himself thereafter to religion, to the defence of Port-Royal in the Provincial Letters, and to the apology. He died in Paris on 19 August 1662, at thirty-nine, having given his possessions to the poor.
The Night of Fire
The document found in his coat.
On 23 November 1654, from about half past ten in the evening until about half past twelve, Pascal had an experience he recorded on a small sheet of paper and then copied onto parchment, and which he carried sewn into the lining of his doublet for the remaining eight years of his life, transferring it each time he changed coats. A servant found it after his death. It begins with the year, the date, the saints' feasts, the hours, and then a single word: Fire. Then: God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and scholars. Certainty, certainty, feeling, joy, peace. God of Jesus Christ. Thy God shall be my God. Forgetfulness of the world and of everything except God. Joy, joy, joy, tears of joy. And at the end: total submission to Jesus Christ and to my director. Eternally in joy for a day's exercise on earth. I will not forget thy word. Amen.
The Memorial is printed at the front of most editions and it is the key to the rest. The man who wrote the wager and the two infinities had two hours of certainty that he never described and never doubted, and the apology was written from inside that certainty for people who had not had it. The distinction it draws, between the God of Abraham and the God of the philosophers, is the book's argument in one line.
Port-Royal and the Jansenists
The community behind the book.
Jansenism took its name from Cornelius Jansen, whose Augustinus of 1640 argued for a strict Augustinian doctrine of grace: that fallen humanity cannot will the good without God's efficacious grace, which is given to few, and that the Jesuit theology of free cooperation with grace was a Pelagian softening. The movement's centre was the convent of Port-Royal outside Paris, where Pascal's sister Jacqueline was a nun and where a group of learned laymen, the solitaires, lived in retreat. Rome condemned five propositions attributed to Jansen in 1653, and the community was persecuted for the rest of the century; the convent was razed in 1710.
Pascal's Provincial Letters of 1656 and 1657 defended Port-Royal against the Jesuits with a wit that made them a classic of French prose and did the Jesuits lasting damage. The apology was to be the positive counterpart: not a defence of a faction but a demonstration that Christianity, in its Augustinian form, was the only account of the human condition that fitted the facts. The Pensées are Augustinian throughout, and readers of the Confessions will find the same restlessness and the same diagnosis.
The Project of the Apology
What the book was going to be, as far as it can be known.
Pascal's method, which he set out in a fragment on the order of the work, was to begin not from God but from man. He would show the sceptic his own condition: the disproportion of his place in the cosmos, the wretchedness of his life, the greatness that survives in his awareness of the wretchedness, his inability to know himself, his flight from himself into activity, his subjection to custom and imagination, the failure of the philosophers to account for him. Then he would show that this double nature, wretched and great, is exactly what the Christian doctrine of a fallen creature made in God's image predicts, and that no other account, not the Stoic and not the sceptic, fits. Then he would turn to the proofs: the Jewish people as a witness, the prophecies fulfilled, the miracles, the figure of Christ, the hidden God who reveals himself to those who seek. The apology would end in the heart's recognition rather than the mind's demonstration, since the God of the philosophers is not the God who was fire.
The first half exists in something like the intended form. The second half is fragments. Readers should expect the diagnosis to be more complete than the cure.
The Ordering Problem
Which edition, and why it matters.
The 1670 Port-Royal edition selected and softened. In 1844 Faugère published from the manuscripts. In 1897 Léon Brunschvicg arranged the fragments by theme in an order of his own, and his numbering became standard for most of the twentieth century and is still what many quotations cite. In 1951 Louis Lafuma published an order based on the two seventeenth-century copies of Pascal's papers, which preserve his own bundles, and this, refined by Philippe Sellier in 1976, is now the scholarly consensus: the titled chapters first, in Pascal's order, then the unsorted bundles. Krailsheimer's Penguin follows Lafuma; the Oxford translation by Honor Levi follows Sellier. Readers switching between editions will find the same fragment under different numbers, and the Penguin has a concordance.
The ordering is not pedantry. The Brunschvicg order made the book a collection of maxims; the Lafuma order shows an argument in progress, and the difference in reading experience is large.
The Disproportion of Man
The fragment on the two infinities, and the book's most famous page after the wager.
Let man contemplate nature whole, Pascal says: the sun, the stars, the earth as a point, and then the whole visible world as a point in the bosom of nature, and let him lose himself in the immensity. Then let him look at a mite, with its tiny limbs and veins and blood and humours and drops, and in the drops further worlds, each with its firmament and planets and earth, and on that earth mites, and so without end. Man is suspended between the two abysses of the infinite and the void, a nothing compared to the infinite and an everything compared to nothing, a mean between all and nothing. He cannot grasp either extreme; the beginnings and ends of things are hidden in an impenetrable secret; he floats on a vast middle, always uncertain, and everything he builds to secure himself shifts and leaves him.
The passage was written by the man who had established the vacuum and it is the first great expression of the cosmological vertigo that the new science produced. The eternal silence of these infinite spaces terrifies me, says a nearby fragment, and the terror is the argument: a creature so placed cannot rest in what it knows.
The Thinking Reed
The counter-fragment, and the book's definition of dignity.
Man is only a reed, the weakest thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed. The whole universe need not arm itself to crush him; a vapour, a drop of water, is enough to kill him. But if the universe crushed him, man would still be nobler than what kills him, because he knows that he is dying and knows the advantage the universe has over him, and the universe knows nothing of this. All our dignity consists in thought. It is from there that we must raise ourselves, not from space and time, which we cannot fill. Let us labour, then, to think well; that is the principle of morality.
The two fragments together are the book's picture of the human being: nothing in the scale of things, everything in the awareness of it. The greatness is not a consolation for the wretchedness; it is what makes the wretchedness felt.
Wretchedness and Greatness
The doctrine that organises the first half.
Man's greatness is so evident, Pascal says, that it can be deduced from his wretchedness: what is nature in animals is wretchedness in man, because he has fallen from a better state that was once his. Who is unhappy at not being king except a deposed king? We are the ruins of something, and the ruins remember. Every human phenomenon shows the double nature: our reason, which is great, and its subjection to imagination and custom, which is wretched; our desire for truth, which is great, and our inability to find it, which is wretched; our sense of justice and our failure to agree on what it is. The Stoics saw the greatness and became proud; the sceptics saw the wretchedness and despaired; only a doctrine that holds both, which is the doctrine of the Fall, accounts for what we are.
The argument is not that the Fall is proved by the human condition but that it is the only hypothesis that fits, and Pascal presents it as one would a theory in physics: here are the observations, here is what explains them. The reader is asked to notice that the observations are true before being asked to accept the explanation.
Diversion
The chapter that has been read most, by believers and unbelievers alike.
Why does a man hunt a hare he would not accept as a gift? Why does the king need a retinue, a court, a war? Why do people play for stakes they would refuse if simply handed to them? Because they are not seeking the hare, the stakes or the victory; they are seeking not to think of themselves. Diversion, divertissement, is the whole apparatus by which human beings avoid being alone with their condition, since to be alone in a room, without occupation, is to face one's mortality, ignorance and weakness, and that is unbearable. All human unhappiness, Pascal says, comes from one thing: not knowing how to stay still in a room. The king surrounded by people whose only care is to divert him is nonetheless miserable the moment he is left to think, and the man who fills his day so that he need not is running from what he would find.
The chapter is a description of the seventeenth-century court and of every century since, and it has been the source of more secular quotation than any other part of the book. Its point is not that activity is bad but that its function is flight, and that the flight shows what we are fleeing.
The Hateful Self
A hard fragment and a central one.
The self is hateful, Pascal writes, and he means it: the self makes itself the centre of everything, would subject everything to itself, and is therefore the enemy of every other self, which would do the same. Politeness covers this and does not remove it. He adds an observation about self-knowledge: if everyone knew what others said of them, there would not be four friends in the world; we are so made that we cannot bear to be seen as we are, and we spend our lives constructing an imaginary self in the eyes of others and neglecting the real one. The fragment connects to the chapter on diversion and to the doctrine of the Fall: the self we cannot stay in a room with is the self we also cannot let others see, and both flights are from the same thing.
Custom, Imagination and Justice
The sceptical chapters, which owe most to Montaigne.
What is justice? Three degrees of latitude reverse all jurisprudence; a meridian decides the truth; a river is a ridiculous boundary. Justice is what is established, and it is established by custom, which has no authority but that people have forgotten its origin. Imagination is the mistress of error, more powerful than reason, and it decides who is respected: the magistrate's robe, the doctor's cap, the king's guards, all work on the imagination, and without them the men beneath would be seen as they are. The greatest philosopher on a plank over a precipice will tremble though his reason tells him he is safe. Pascal takes all this from Montaigne, whom he read closely and distrusted, and turns it: Montaigne used scepticism to recommend ease; Pascal uses it to show that reason cannot ground the life we live and that something else must.
Against the Philosophers
The verdict on the alternatives.
Two schools have tried to account for man. The Stoics, Epictetus above all, saw the greatness, told man that his duty was in his own power and that he could be godlike by his will, and fell into pride, since they did not see that the will is corrupt. The sceptics, Montaigne above all, saw the wretchedness, showed that reason cannot ground anything, and fell into indifference, since they did not see the greatness that made the wretchedness felt. Each is right about half and wrong about the whole, and the two halves cannot be joined by philosophy, since any philosophy that holds both will contradict itself. Only the Christian doctrine, of a nature originally great and now fallen, holds them without contradiction, and it does so by revelation rather than by reason. Pascal's conversation with his director on Epictetus and Montaigne, recorded separately, is the fullest statement of this and is printed in some editions.
The Hidden God
The doctrine that answers the obvious objection.
If God exists, why is he not evident? Pascal's answer is Isaiah's: truly thou art a hidden God. God has willed to be hidden: to give enough light to those who seek him and enough obscurity to those who do not, so that he is known by the heart's disposition rather than by proof. If he were evident, faith would be compelled and worthless; if he were wholly absent, seeking would be hopeless. The world as it is, with its signs and its silences, is exactly what a God who wanted to be sought and not merely seen would make. This is why the apology cannot be a demonstration and why the wager is addressed to the will: the evidence is sufficient to move but not to compel, and the last step is one the seeker must take.
The Deus absconditus became, through Pascal, a central theme of modern religious thought, and readers of apophatic mysticism will recognise a cousin, though Pascal's hidden God is hidden by will rather than by nature.
The book's method is what makes it last. Pascal does not begin with God and argue down; he begins with the reader and argues in. He describes the two infinities and asks whether the reader has felt the vertigo. He describes diversion and asks whether the reader can sit in a room. He describes the self we cannot look at and asks whether the reader has one. Only when the reader has admitted the wound does he offer the cure, and by then the reader has learned something true whether or not they take it. That is why atheists read the Pensées: the first half is an anatomy of the human condition that does not depend on the second, and Nietzsche, who hated the second, called the first the one Christian he could not despise.
The Wager
The fragment for which the book is known, given fairly and in its place.
It is written on a single sheet, in every direction, with insertions and crossings-out, and it is a dialogue with an imagined sceptic who has followed the argument this far and is stuck. Reason cannot decide whether God is; the infinite distance between us and him makes proof impossible. But you must wager; you are already committed, and to live is to bet one way or the other. Then weigh the stakes. If you wager that God is, and he is, you gain an infinity of infinitely happy life; if he is not, you lose a finite life of finite pleasures. If you wager that he is not, and he is, you lose everything; if he is not, you gain a little. Where an infinite gain is possible against a finite loss, and the odds are even or better, reason itself says wager. The sceptic answers that he is so made that he cannot believe. Pascal replies: then learn from those who were bound as you are and are now free; they began by acting as if they believed, taking holy water, having masses said, and belief came. What have you to lose?
The wager is not a proof of God and Pascal did not think it was. It is an argument that the person who sees the stakes and cannot decide has a reason to act, and that action reshapes the heart. It is the application of the probability theory Pascal had invented to the one bet that cannot be avoided, and its cold arithmetic is deliberately the language of the gaming table he had left. Its weaknesses, that it assumes only two options, that it seems to recommend belief for profit, that a God who rewarded such calculation would be strange, have been urged since Voltaire, and most of them Pascal anticipated: the wager is a last push for the person already seeking, not the ground of faith.
The Heart Has Its Reasons
The epistemology under the whole.
The heart has its reasons which reason does not know. Pascal's heart is not sentiment; it is the faculty of first principles, by which we know that space has three dimensions and that numbers are infinite, which reason cannot prove and on which reason rests. It is also the faculty by which God is known: it is the heart which feels God, not reason; that is faith. Reason's last step is to recognise that there are infinitely many things beyond it, and the person who does not know this is merely feeble. The fragment on the three orders, of bodies, of minds and of charity, each infinitely above the last, gives the structure: kings and the rich are great in the first order, Archimedes in the second, Christ in the third, and no accumulation of a lower order reaches the next. The mathematician who had proved theorems at sixteen knew exactly what the second order could do and exactly where it stopped.
Prophecy, Miracles and the Jews
The second half's evidence, which has aged worst.
Pascal's positive proofs were to be historical: that the Jewish people, preserved through all history as a witness, carried a book that foretold a Messiah; that the prophecies were fulfilled in Christ in a way that could not be contrived; that the miracles were attested; and that the Church's continuity confirmed the rest. The fragments on these subjects are many and detailed, with long lists of prophetic texts, and they belong to a seventeenth-century apologetic that later biblical scholarship has dismantled. Readers should know that Pascal thought this material central and that it is the part of the book least read now. Its interest is in showing how a mind of the first rank weighed such evidence before the historical criticism that would change the weighing.
The Mystery of Jesus
A fragment unlike the others.
Among the loose papers is a meditation on Christ in Gethsemane, written in short lines, in which Pascal speaks to Jesus and Jesus speaks to him: Jesus will be in agony until the end of the world; we must not sleep during that time. Console yourself; you would not seek me if you had not found me. I thought of you in my agony; I shed such drops of blood for you. It is the most personal thing in the book after the Memorial, and it shows what the apology was for: not the winning of an argument but the bringing of a reader to the place where the mathematician had been on the night of fire. Readers of the Imitation of Christ, which Pascal knew, will recognise the register.
The Style
Pascal wrote the best French prose of his century in the Provincial Letters, and the Pensées, being notes, are sharper still: aphorisms, questions, unfinished sentences, single words. The famous fragments are famous because they are perfect: the eternal silence, the thinking reed, the heart's reasons, the room. Krailsheimer's translation is plain and accurate and keeps the sentences short. A reader who knows French should read the original; a reader who does not will lose the cadence and keep the thought.
The Afterlife of the Book
Voltaire attacked it and could not stop quoting it. Chateaubriand made it the centre of his Christian revival. Nietzsche called Pascal the only logical Christian and said his corruption by Christianity was the most instructive fall he knew. Kierkegaard read him closely and the leap owes something to the wager. Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor and Ivan's rebellion are arguments with him. T. S. Eliot's introduction to the English edition made him a modernist. Camus's absurd is the two infinities without the cure, and Simone Weil's affliction is Pascal's wretchedness. The book has been the point at which modern doubt and Christian faith have met, and it has been claimed by both because it describes the doubt more truly than the doubters and the faith more honestly than the faithful.
The Translations
A. J. Krailsheimer's Penguin, 1966, revised 1995, follows the Lafuma order and is clear, accurate and the most read; it is the edition reviewed here. Honor Levi's Oxford, 1995, follows Sellier and has good notes. W. F. Trotter's older version, with Eliot's introduction, follows Brunschvicg and is still in print in the Everyman edition; it is the source of most English quotations. Roger Ariew's Hackett, 2005, follows Sellier and is the choice for study. Krailsheimer for reading, Ariew or Levi for the notes.
The Objections
Three.
The wager is bad faith. To believe for the sake of the payoff is not belief, and a God who rewarded it would be contemptible. Pascal half answers this; the objection stands against the fragment read alone.
The proofs have collapsed. The prophecies, the miracles and the argument from the Jews rest on a reading of Scripture that historical criticism has undone.
The diagnosis is too dark. Pascal's Jansenism sees corruption everywhere and grace almost nowhere, and a reader may find the wretchedness overstated and the greatness given too little room.
Who Should Read It
Read it if you have felt the eternal silence of the infinite spaces, or found that you cannot sit in a room, and want to meet the person who first said so.
Read it if you are a believer and want an apologetic that starts from the sceptic's chair and does not pretend the chair is empty.
Read it if you are not a believer and want the most honest Christian account of what you already know about yourself, from a mind that respected yours.
Read the Memorial, the two infinities, the thinking reed, diversion and the wager, in that order, and then the rest as the fragments come. It is a book to keep on the desk rather than to finish.
The book's teaching is that the human being is a contradiction that must be lived rather than resolved. Nothing in the scale of the cosmos and everything in the awareness of it; unable to know the truth and unable to stop wanting it; fleeing the self in every activity and finding it waiting in every room. Pascal's answer was a religion that held both halves, and readers who cannot take the answer have still taken the question, because he asked it more exactly than anyone before or since. The practical wisdom is in the chapter on diversion: whatever you are running from is what you are, and the room you cannot sit in is where you would find it. He sat in it, on a November night, and came out with a scrap of paper that he wore against his skin for the rest of his life. The book is what he wrote for those who had not yet gone in.
The two infinities, the thinking reed, diversion, the hidden God and the wager: the fragments of a mathematician's unfinished defence of faith.
Affiliate disclosure: Thalira earns a small commission on purchases made through the link above, at no additional cost to you. Our account of the wager's weaknesses and the collapse of the historical proofs is given above and was not softened for the link.
Frequently Asked Questions
What are the Pensées?
Around a thousand fragments, from a line to several pages, that Pascal wrote between about 1656 and his death in 1662 as notes toward a defence of the Christian religion he never finished. They were found in bundles after his death, some sorted by him into titled chapters and the rest loose, and have been published in various orders since 1670.
Who was Blaise Pascal?
A French mathematician, physicist, inventor and religious writer, 1623 to 1662, who proved theorems on conic sections at sixteen, built a calculating machine at nineteen, established the existence of the vacuum, founded probability theory with Fermat, and after a mystical experience in 1654 gave himself to religion and to the Jansenist community at Port-Royal. He died at thirty-nine.
What is the wager?
An argument addressed to someone who cannot decide whether God exists: since reason cannot settle it and you must bet one way or the other by how you live, weigh the stakes. If you bet on God and are right, you gain infinitely; if wrong, you lose little. If you bet against and are wrong, you lose everything. So bet on God, and then act as if you believed, and belief will follow.
Is the wager the book's main argument?
No. It is one fragment among a thousand, written on a scrap that Pascal filled in every direction, and it is addressed only to the person who has already seen the misery of life without God and is stuck at the last step. The book's real argument is the account of the human condition that leads a reader to that point.
What is the thinking reed?
Pascal's image of the human being: a reed, the weakest thing in nature, which the universe can crush with a drop of water, but a thinking reed, which knows it is being crushed and knows the universe's advantage, while the universe knows nothing. All our dignity is in thought, and the universe has none.
What are the two infinities?
The infinitely large, the cosmos beyond any telescope, and the infinitely small, the mite whose body contains worlds within worlds. The human being is suspended between the two, a nothing compared to the infinite and an everything compared to nothing, unable to grasp either extreme, and the fragment on the disproportion of man is the book's most vertiginous.
What is diversion?
Divertissement: the whole apparatus of activity, hunting, gaming, war, conversation, business, by which people avoid being alone in a room with themselves, because to be alone is to face mortality, ignorance and wretchedness. Pascal's claim is that all human unhappiness comes from not being able to sit still in a room.
What is the hidden God?
Pascal's reading of Isaiah, that God hides himself: the world gives enough light to those who seek and enough obscurity to those who do not, so that neither the believer nor the unbeliever can claim proof. God is not absent but veiled, and the veil is itself an instruction about what kind of seeking is required.
What is the Memorial?
A scrap of parchment recording Pascal's experience on the night of 23 November 1654, from about half past ten to half past midnight: Fire. God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and scholars. Certainty. Joy. Tears. He sewed it into the lining of his coat and it was found there after his death.
What order should I read them in?
The Lafuma or Sellier order, which follows Pascal's own bundles as far as they go and puts the sorted chapters first, is now standard and is what Krailsheimer's Penguin uses. The older Brunschvicg order arranged them by theme and is what most quotations still cite. Start with the sorted chapters and read the loose fragments after.
Is it a Christian book only?
Its aim is Christian, but its first half is a description of the human condition, its wretchedness and greatness, its boredom, self-deception and fear, that has been read and quoted by atheists, Nietzsche and Camus among them, as the most unflinching account of what it is to be human. The diagnosis stands without the cure.
Who should read it?
Anyone who has felt the vertigo of the two infinities or the fear of the empty room, readers of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky who want their ancestor, believers who want an apologetic that starts from doubt, and anyone who wants to see a mathematician's mind applied to the question of what a human being is.
Sit in the room
Pascal's one practical instruction, hidden in a diagnosis, is to do the thing he says nobody can: sit still in a room. Not to meditate, not to pray, not to plan, but to be there without diversion for long enough that what you have been avoiding arrives. He says it will be unbearable, and he is usually right for the first quarter of an hour. What comes after is the subject of the second half of his book, which he did not live to write, and which every reader has to finish for themselves. The room is where he found the fire. It is at least where you will find out what you have been running from, and he thought that was most of the way.
Sources & References
- Pascal, Blaise. Pensées, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer, rev. ed., Penguin Classics, 1995.
- Pascal, Blaise. Pensées and Other Writings, trans. Honor Levi, Oxford World's Classics, 1995.
- Pascal, Blaise. Pensées, ed. Philippe Sellier, Classiques Garnier, 1991, for the French text and order.
- Hammond, Nicholas, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Pascal, 2003.
- Kolakowski, Leszek. God Owes Us Nothing: A Brief Remark on Pascal's Religion and on the Spirit of Jansenism, Chicago, 1995.
- Eliot, T. S. "The Pensées of Pascal," 1931, in Selected Essays.